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Abstract: In the UK, national and local governments are struggling to cope with the
economic crisis which ensued in 2008. The effects of that crisis are still being felt in
the United Kingdom, with significant reductions in public sector expenditure leading
to budget cuts in the criminal justice system and public services more generally. In June
2013, the UK Chancellor projected further expenditure cuts from 2015 onward.
Justice reinvestment (JR) has been proposed by UK policy makers and campaign
groups as one way of responding to these economic problems. Proponents argue that, at
a modest level, it has the potential to deliver efficiency gains in how the criminal justice
system is operated. On a more ambitious scale, JR may fundamentally transform the
way in which criminal justice services are delivered.
Drawing on evidence from JR experiments in the United Kingdom—including
Payment by Results (PbR) pilots in England and Wales—this paper examines the
nature and extent to which models of JR can be implemented in an “age of auster-
ity” against the backdrop of the wider application of PbR commissioning for criminal
justice and related services.
Keywords: justice reinvestment, criminal justice policy, payment by results, reform,
economic, reoffending
INTRODUCTION
Justice reinvestment (JR) is an innovative approach to criminal justice at a
social level. The motivation of JR is that it may be more economically efficient
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to prevent criminality in a neighborhood than to try to deal with crime and the
consequences of crime—in short “being efficient on crime, being efficient on
the causes of crime” (Fox, Albertson, & Wong, 2013a). This holistic approach
locates JR within economic and political debates about criminal justice and
suggests that it has much to offer current debates about criminal justice
policy. However, in the breadth of its vision, JR also touches upon broader
debates about social justice and the type of society in which we want to live.
Others might limit the scope of JR merely to cost savings in criminal jus-
tice delivery. There are, of course, other interpretations between these two
perspectives. What underpins them all is economic efficiency in criminal jus-
tice. In these days of cash-strapped Western governments, JR has financial
appeal.
A question which has bedevilled the United Kingdom and other govern-
ments since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 is how to achieve
more public goods or services from every unit of taxpayer money. In April 2009,
David Cameron (the current UK prime minister) prepared for the general elec-
tion of May 2010 by declaring at the Conservative Party spring conference that
“the age of irresponsibility is giving way to the age of austerity.” His vision of a
“good society” would be achieved by “delivering more for less” through four big
changes for the role of government and the state:
First, a return to traditional public spending control.
Second, a new culture of thrift in government.
Third, curing our big social problems, not just treating them.
And fourth, imagination and innovation as we harness the opportunities of
technology to transform the way public services are delivered. (Cameron, 2009)
Ostensibly Cameron’s notion of “delivering more for less” and the idea of curing
social problems rather than “just treating them” accords with the approach
offered by JR.
In this article we briefly describe the principles of JR as developed in the
United Kingdom. As we shall see, arguably there has been little agreement on
what may be gained from JR, howmuch can be saved, and even what comprises
JR. We will examine the implementation of JR in the United Kingdom, assess-
ing the extent to which initiatives labeled as JR have fully tested the principles
of JR. Based on these initiatives we will identify two models of JR, a social jus-
tice model and a criminal justice system redesign model, and posit that rather
than being mutually exclusive they form a continuum along which JR initia-
tives in the United Kingdom and other countries can be located. In addition,
against a backdrop of continued and growing restrictions on public expendi-
ture we examine the extent to which JR can and should act as a counter (as
suggested by some campaign groups) to the prevailing UK policy imperative
around marketization, in particular the purchasing of criminal justice and
related services through Payment by Results (PbR) commissioning.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUSTICE REINVESTMENT POLICY IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM
Applying Economic Thinking to Criminal justice Policy
The term “justice reinvestment” arises from the observation that, if there
are more cost effective ways of reducing crime than what is currently on offer,
the social resources saved from the implementation of a successful intervention
will more than outweigh the costs. Therefore investment in programs which
reduce criminality will lead to a return, in terms of future costs foregone, which
will more than pay for the project. It is suggested these savings are reinvested
in further justice promoting innovations, leading to a virtuous spiral in which
criminality declines and costs are reduced.
The development of policy positions on JR in the United Kingdom owes
much to the seminal paper by Tucker and Cadora (2003) based on analysis in
the United States, where they argued.
there is no logic to spending a million dollars a year to incarcerate people from
one block in Brooklyn—over half for non-violent drug offenses—and return them,
on average, in less than three years stigmatized, unskilled, and untrained to the
same unchanged block. This unquestioned national dependence on mass incarcer-
ation reflects a fundamentalist approach to imprisonment that actually sacrifices
public safety. (Tucker and Cadora, 2003, p. 2)
Rob Allen, an early UK proponent of JR and special advisor to the House of
Commons Justice Committee when it produced its influential report on JR
(House of Commons Justice Committee, 2009) argued that, in general, JR has
two key elements. First, it seeks to develop measures and policies to “improve
the prospects not just of individual cases but of particular places” (Allen, 2007,
p. 5). Secondly, JR adopts a strategic approach to the prevention of offend-
ing and reoffending by collecting and analysing data to inform commissioning
decisions (Allen, 2007, p. 5).
Thus, a JR approach recognizes the potential to create a more law-
abiding society in a more effective and less costly way than the traditional
detect/convict/punish approach. Many of the cost savings may come from
reductions in the crime rate. This leads to measurement issues, of course, as it
is not straightforward to assess the level of crimes which have been deterred.
Setting this point aside, however, given appropriate quantitative evidence of
savings made, JR proposes redirecting funds spent on punishment of offenders
to programs designed to tackle the underlying problems which gave rise to the
criminal behavior (Allen, 2008a).
The House of Commons Justice Committee (2009) formulated a four-step
approach to JR that owes much to the data-driven process advocated by the
U.S. Council of State Governments (2010):
1. “Justice mapping”—analysis of the prison population and of relevant public
spending in the communities to which people return from prison
2. Provision of options to policy makers for the generation of savings and
increases in public safety
3. Implementation of options, quantification of savings, and reinvestment in
targeted high-risk communities
4. Measurement of impacts, evaluation, and assurance of effective implemen-
tation
The overriding distinguishing feature of JR is its reliance for validity on
economic theory. It is this aspect which Fox, Albertson, and Wong (2013b)
argue should allow UK politicians to reshape the debate about criminal jus-
tice, enabling the political costs of being thought to be “soft on crime” to be
attenuated:
At the least, economics provides a common ground for justifying and comparing
different approaches and attitudes to criminality. (Fox et al., 2013b)
Moreover, the House of Commons Justice Committee (2009) proposed that
the way to engage the public in a debate about the criminal justice system and
its effectiveness was to link effectiveness to cost and affordability. Taking a
whole population approach, they recommended that.
public information campaigns should seek to promote understanding of the cost of
the criminal justice system to the public purse and where the costs of the failure of
current initiatives fall. The government should use this to gauge public reaction
to the costs of the system. (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2009, p. 160)
Justice Reinvestment and Localism
As part of their comprehensive review of the prison service in England
(and, to some extent, Wales), Do Better, Do Less, the Commission on English
Prisons Today (2009) noted the unsustainable increase in demand (and sup-
ply) of prison places—and this despite the falling rate of criminality in the
nation. Looking abroad (and to Scotland) the commission concluded that it
was possible both to reduce prison numbers and criminality. To achieve this,
the commission recommended a threefold approach: public fears on law and
order must be challenged, moderation rather than excess should be a philoso-
phy of punishment, and a new framework must be realized through practical
and appropriate interventions.
The commission noted (somewhat optimistically) the English character-
istics of being “reserved, moderate, prudent, considered, pragmatic, tolerant,
temperate and forgiving” (p. 32) and suggested these, together with the lack
of confidence the public had in the current criminal justice system, allowed
the foundation of a desire for change in the prison system. In practical terms,
the policies which might be employed were also threefold: localism, JR, and
restorative justice.
The policy of localism allowed the addressing of two issues simultaneously.
According to the commission, while the people of England felt their communi-
ties were increasingly disempowered (Watts, 2008), there was good evidence
to show that justice functions were more efficiently delivered at the local
level (Local Government Information Unit, 2008; Mulgan & Bury, 2006; Stern
& Allen, 2007). It was argued that localizing services and service providers
also lead to an increase in trust (Lappi-Seppälä, 2009; cited in Commission
on English Prisons Today, 2009)—which was associated with both a reduc-
tion of the proportion of the population who are incarcerated and a more
effective series of interventions. The commission also argued that cooperation
between stakeholders was more likely to be achieved at a local, rather than
national, level (p. 51). Localism was, therefore, an approach which might lead
to more correctly aligned incentives as well as a way to make it more likely
interventions would be supported politically and socially and be successful.
In their consideration of the strengths of the JR approach, the Commission
on English Prisons Today (2009) argued “Justice Reinvestment is not about
alternatives within the criminal justice process, it is about alternatives outside
of it” (p. 49). To the commission, the JR approach allowed the holistic consider-
ation of the problem of criminality. It was in the interlinking of localized costs
and benefits—including social costs and benefits—where real opportunities
arose for innovation.
IMPLEMENTING JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Justice Reinvestment as a Misappropriated Concept
In an interview conducted in 2011 (Fox et al., 2013a), Rob Allen, an early
UK proponent of JR, expressed dismay and frustration about the develop-
ment of JR in the United Kingdom. While he welcomed the interest in JR
from national and local policy makers, including civil servants and politicians
from across the political spectrum, he observed that JR was like “motherhood
and apple pie”—nobody is going to disagree with it. However, if you asked
individuals what they meant by JR, this was a different matter.
Allen posited that conceptualizations of JR varied considerably—“three or
four people will give you five or six definitions of what it is.” They vary from
Nick Herbert (the Minister of State for Policing and Criminal Justice from
2010 to 2012) who equated JR to PbR (Herbert, 2010) (according to Allen,
PbR was the “bastard child” of JR) to Allen’s own view of JR as a progres-
sive way of linking together three critical elements: reducing imprisonment,
local responsibility for organizing and resourcing offender rehabilitation and
reintegration, and a focus on effective use of resources.
The cross-party House of Commons Justice Committee’s report Cutting
Crime: The Case for Justice Reinvestment (2009), while considered influential
by some commentators (Fox et al., 2013a), was given a lukewarm reception on
publication by Jack Straw, at that time the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of
State for Justice (Ministry of Justice, 2010a) for the Labour Government. Two
months later, the May 2010 general election ushered the first UK coalition
government in 55 years; a coalition of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat
parties. The Justice Committee report fared no better under the coalition
government—which largely ignored the more fundamental, holistic approach
offered by JR—instead choosing to focus more narrowly on the way in which
justice services were commissioned as the mechanism (so it was suggested) for
driving improvements.
The first bullet point under the “Justice” heading in the coalition agree-
ment read:
We will introduce a “rehabilitation revolution” that will pay independent
providers to reduce reoffending, paid for by the savings this new approach will
generate within the criminal justice system. (Her Majesty’s Government, 2010,
p. 23)
As indicated by the Conservative Party (2009), one of the priority areas for
reform was the introduction of PbR for the rehabilitation of offenders. That is,
provisions would be put in place to hold providers of rehabilitation services to
account for the outcomes achieved. Referring to PbR, the Ministry of Justice
stated:
This is a radical and decentralising reform which will deliver a fundamental
shift in the way rehabilitation is delivered. It will make the concept of justice
reinvestment real by allowing providers to invest money in the activity that will
prevent offending rather than spending money on dealing with the consequences.
(Ministry of Justice, 2010b, p. 38)
PbR is not at odds with the concept of JR; however, as noted by Fox et al.
(2013a), while PbR might form a part of a JR project it is not, in isolation,
capable of making the concept of JR real. We will return to this and the wider
rollout of PbR commissioning announced in the UK government’s strategy
for the management of offenders in the community published in May 2013
(Ministry of Justice, 2013b).
Early Justice Reinvestment Initiatives
A number of projects in the United Kingdom have implemented discreet ele-
ments that could be associated with JR. However, to date none represents a full
implementation in the terms of the Justice Committee’s four-step approach to
JR described above.
The Diamond Initiative, for example, a two-year scheme (ending in March
2011) piloted by London Probation and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS),
working as part of the London Criminal Justice Board, used elements of the
JR approach—specifically justice mapping. The initiative brought together
multiagency teams of police, probation, and local authority officers to reset-
tle offenders back into the community following a prison sentence of less
than 12 months. The project was focused primarily on offenders in custody
and after release from custody (Allen, 2008b) rather than taking the broader
view, characteristic of some JR projects in the United States, of offenders’
criminal careers being rooted in deprived communities. The Commission on
English Prisons Today (2009) argued that, rather than redirecting resources
into communities, Diamond Initiative resources were used for the manage-
ment of individual offenders; in this sense the Diamond Initiative was simply a
reinvention of after-care schemes for short-term prisoners and an extension of
multiagency public protection arrangements. According to Allen (interviewed
for Fox et al., 2013a), because of the multicultural makeup and population
churn of London, it was unclear how many of the offenders on the program
were UK citizens from the neighborhoods where the project teams worked.
Therefore the geographical focus of the project was not as significant as
intended.
In 2005, the International Centre for Prison Studies at Kings College
London, with the backing of Gateshead council, began the Gateshead Project—
a pilot of a JR-style approach in financing and delivering services to offenders
and exoffenders. Gateshead is a town in northern England close to Newcastle
with a population, according to the 2001 census, of 191,000. The unemploy-
ment rate for Gateshead was higher than the national average and those
employed receive, on average, correspondingly lower wages; the borough was
ranked the 26th most disadvantaged out of the 354 in England (Allen, Jallab,
& Snaith, 2007).
The aim of the project was to divert money from the criminal justice bud-
get into community support, collect data, and thus determine whether the
approach was practicable—in the sense of delivering economic efficiencies.
However, the project met with only limited success. Allen et al. (2007) describe
the difficulties which the project struggled to overcome.
The first step in much JR work is justice mapping; however, as Allen et al.
(2007) noted, the prison service was unable to provide information on where
the offenders lived prior to imprisonment or where they lived on release. The
practice of giving prisoners an additional discharge grant if they reported that
they had no fixed abode on release might have created a perverse incentive for
offenders to provide inaccurate data. A dataset of sorts was accessed through
the probation service but, as the service generally did not support those on
short-term sentences, it is likely that the data was incomplete. Therefore,
although justice mapping was carried out, it was likely the coverage was
limited.
Secondly, the possibility of a neighborhood-based approach to resettling
prisoners was discussed with the probation service, the local authority, and
with the project’s advisory board. However, it proved difficult to obtain a
consensus about the appropriate form of intervention. It became clear that
local residents would not be happy with facilities for released prisoners being
located in their midst; neither did released prisoners wish to visit local ser-
vices, possibly for fear of stigma. Also, it was suggested resources were not
necessarily available for probation staff relocation from headquarters (Allen
et al., 2007).
Although Allen et al. (2007) did not express this explicitly, the Gateshead
project seemed to have struggled with the limited financial incentives avail-
able to encourage local agencies, particularly local authorities, to invest in
preventative programs or community-based alternatives to prison. This was
despite an explicit aim of the project being the shifting of “the distribution of
decision-making power from national to local in promoting local solutions to
local problems” (Gateshead Housing Company, 2005). A close reading of Allen
et al. (2007) suggests the project team could not develop the kinds of sophisti-
cated economic modeling of different options, which is characteristic of some JR
projects in the United States. Such analysis might have been useful in press-
ing the JR case. In contrast, where the Council of State Governments’ Justice
Center undertake JR in the United States, they require bipartisan support
from the beginning.
A further and related problem related to the scale of the project. Arguably,
it was unrealistic to expect that such an approach would or could work effec-
tively at the level of a single local authority given that funding decisions about
the criminal justice system were and are made primarily at a national and
regional level. In addition Allen (interviewed for Fox et al., 2013a) suggested
that a geographic focus was perhaps more problematic in the United Kingdom
than in the United States. Allen argued that while there was some correla-
tion between people who go to prisons and concentrations in neighborhoods, in
the United Kingdom “we don’t have million dollar blocks”—a reference to an
observation by Tucker and Cadora (2003) and recounted by Cadora:
The phrase “million-dollar blocks” was coined to refer to research findings which
show that in certain communities states are spending up to a million dollars per
block to cycle residents back and forth from prison each year. (Cadora, 2007, p. 11)
Devolution of Budgets and Cashability of Savings from the
Criminal Justice System
As mentioned earlier, one of the key principles for JR in the UK has been
an increased emphasis on localism and the devolving of criminal justice bud-
gets to a local level. This has underpinned two pilot programs initiated by
the Ministry of Justice and commissioned as part of the Ministry’s four PbR
pilots: the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot and Youth Justice Reinvestment
Pathfinder Initiative. Recently the latter scheme has in part been superseded
by the transfer of the budget in April 2013 for remanding young people (aged
up to 18) into custody from the central government to local authorities in
England and Wales. The two pilot initiatives and the transfer of the remand
into custody budget for youths serve to illustrate some of the difficulties
of achieving and locally reinvesting any cashable savings from the criminal
justice system. These difficulties appear to be inherent in any JR initiative
implemented in the United Kingdom—but also potentially elsewhere.
The Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot which ran from two years from July
2011 to June 2013 had at its heart a local financial incentives approach to
reward a successful reduction in demand on the criminal justice system (Wong,
Meadows, Warburton, Webb, Young, & Barraclough, 2013). It was piloted in six
sites: Greater Manchester (an urban conurbation comprising ten local author-
ities with a combined population of 2.69 million according to the UK Office
of National Statistics) and five individual London boroughs (urban areas with
populations ranging from 247,000 to 365,000 according to the UK Office of
National Statistics), all of which had previously participated in the Diamond
Initiative mentioned previously. The aim of the pilot was to reduce demand on
the criminal justice system, specifically:
Where demand falls beyond a certain threshold (5% for adults and 10% for youths,
up to a maximum of 20%) in either of the two measurement years compared to the
baseline, local partners will receive a success payment. In the event that demand
does not fall below the specified threshold in any of the measurement years, no
payment is made to the local partners. (Ministry of Justice, 2013b)
The total cost of demand at each site was calculated by multiplying the
agreed demand metrics by prices for each metric agreed on prior to commence-
ment of the pilot and held at the same level for both years (Ministry of Justice,
2013a). The demand metrics were the numbers of:
Under 12-month adult custodial convictions and custody months from those
convictions, community orders, suspended sentence orders, other convictions
(non-custody and non-court order convictions) in magistrates courts, and a
range of probation requirements (“Accredited programme”; “Unpaid work”; “Drug
treatment”; “Supervision”; “Specified activity”; “Mental health”; “Alcohol treat-
ment”; “Residence”; “Curfew”; “Exclusion”; “Prohibited activity”; and “Attendance
centre”).
Youth metrics are volume of: under 24-month custodial convictions and cus-
tody months from those convictions, community orders, and other convictions in
magistrates courts. (Wong et al., 2013)
The prices were based on what the Ministry of Justice agencies (National
Offender Management service, Her Majesties Court and Tribunal Service, and
the Legal Services Commission) agreed were the potential cashable savings
from a reduction in the metrics (Ministry of Justice, 2013a).
As indicated by Ministry of Justice (2013a) these estimates of savings were
specific to the pilot and did not represent estimates of the costs of delivering
the services. Different prices were reduced by different amounts based on an
estimate by the justice agencies on the likely realizable savings associated with
the different disposals (Ministry of Justice, 2013a). For example, the “saving”
made through reducing by 1 month a custodial sentence of under 12 months
was £360 (Ministry of Justice, 2013a). This contrasts with £2,553, the esti-
mated average monthly cost of a custodial sentence of under 12 months. This
had been calculated based on £30,637, the annual resource expenditure cost
per prisoner in a Category C prison (Ministry of Justice, 2012). A Category C
prison is the least costly secure prison. In other words, for this metric, only 14%
of the saving in the estimated delivery cost (of a short-term sentence) could be
converted to a cashable saving.
Interviews with stakeholders involved in the pilot in May/June 2011 for
Fox et al. (2013a) suggested that the level of cashability was determined by two
things. One, the duration of the pilot; it was due to run for two years—made
the interviewees suggest it might not run long enough to achieve substantial
savings. Two, the size of the pilot was on too small a scale. The economies of
scale required to close, for example, the wing of a prison, may be beyond the
scope of such a pilot (Fox et al., 2013a).
In their interim evaluation report of the pilot, Wong et al. (2013) found that
the pilot had:
provided insufficient incentives to encourage local agencies to make significant
investments in reducing demand and/or make substantial changes to practice
(that were not already in train). (Wong et al., 2013)
This was due to the perceived low level of payments for reducing demand
(due to the problem of cashability); a perceived inability of agencies to imple-
ment interventions that were likely to reduce demand; the payment structure
(there was no upfront payment to invest in interventions or processes); and the
complexity of metrics (Wong et al., 2013).
In addition, the limited availability of robust research evidence and
cost–benefit analysis to inform the local sites’ choice of interventions and
approaches was a barrier to implementation of the pilot except in one site—
Greater Manchester. In this site they made best use of the evidence available
and committed to evaluating the effectiveness of promising interventions
(Wong et al., 2013). Greater Manchester was also the only site to collate man-
agement data and review the performance of interventions that were part of
the pilot’s portfolio (Wong et al., 2013).
Assessed against the four-step approach to JR proposed by the Justice
Committee (discussed previously), only one of the six sites in the pilot (Greater
Manchester) appeared to take up the opportunity to attempt a JR approach to
the delivery of local criminal justice services.
The Youth Justice Reinvestment Pathfinder Initiative (ongoing until
September 2013) is based on a partial devolving of custodial budgets for young
offenders (aged up to 18). Ministry of Justice (2010b) states:
Specifically, we are proposing that local authorities should share both the
financial risk of young people entering custody, and the financial rewards if fewer
young people require a custodial sentence. We therefore propose to run a small
number of pilots, each working in partnership with a consortia of volunteer local
authorities. We will agree to a target reduction in the use of custody with the
consortia and provide a reinvestment grant, on top of the standard grant to
Youth Offending Teams, to help them achieve this. (Ministry of Justice, 2010b,
para. 256, 257)
The sites which commenced the pilot in October 2011 were: Birmingham, a sin-
gle local authority (an urban area with 1.07 million population according to the
UK Office for National Statistics); West London, a consortium of three London
boroughs (an urban area with a combined population of 899,000 according the
UK Office for National Statistics); North East London Partnership, a consor-
tium of seven London boroughs (an urban area with a combined population
of 1.82 million according the UK Office for National Statistics); and West
Yorkshire, a consortium of five local authorities (with urban and rural areas
and a combined population of 2.27 million according the UK Office for National
Statistics). At the end of the first year two sites withdrew from the pilot,
invoking a no-penalty break clause.
In contrast to the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot which had a plethora of
demand metrics, the Youth Justice Reinvestment Pathfinder Initiative focused
on one demand metric—reducing custody bed nights for both the remand pop-
ulation and custodial sentences (Youth Justice Board, 2010a). This focus on
reducing custody bed nights accords with the fundamental principle of JR
envisaged by Tucker and Cadora (2003) and championed by Allen—that of
reducing the use of imprisonment.
In terms of the cashability for this pilot, the sites receive a grant based on
the costs of community alternatives to custody. At the end of the two-year pilot,
if the sites fall short of their custody bed night reduction target they must pay
back a proportion of the grant based on the average weighted bed price of that
shortfall (Youth Justice Board, 2010b)—this price being the cost across the
secure youth estate, i.e., young offender institution (YOI), secure training cen-
ter, and secure children’s home (Youth Justice Board, 2010a). In terms of scale,
in order to deliver the “significant savings” required of this pilot, arguably the
most important eligibility criteria was the requirement that each area (which
could be one or more local authorities) must have at least 50 young people in
custody at any one time (Youth Justice Board, 2010b).
In practice, the Youth Justice Reinvestment Pathfinder Initiative has
in part been superseded by the Legal Aid, Sentencing, and Punishment of
Offenders Act 2012. Part 3, Chapter 3, Sections 91–107 of the act provide
for the transfer of financial responsibility for remands for young people (aged
up to 18) in custody to local authorities from April 2013. Ostensibly, the pol-
icy shift underpinning this accords with the principle of localism promoted
by the Commission on English Prisons Today (2009) and Allen, as well as
the JR proposition of reducing the use of custody. However, JR involves mea-
suring realized savings—this is not straightforward, as a significant degree
of complexity lies behind the budget transfer. Further, there are limitations
to the level of funding local authorities are able to invest locally in alterna-
tive provision. This is illustrated by the settlement for 2013/2014 detailed in
the Ministry of Justice and Youth Justice Board’s response to the consultation
published in February 2013:
We intend to distribute funding to meet the costs of remands to under-18 young
offender institutions on the basis of 3 year historic data on secure remand bed
nights.
There will be no transfer of funding to meet the costs of remands to secure
children’s homes and secure training centres.
The cost of remands to youth detention accommodation will be recovered on the
basis of sector prices. (Ministry of Justice and Youth Justice Board, 2013)
According to the ministry and the Youth Justice Board the budget to be
transferred to local authorities has been affected by three variables (Ministry
of Justice and Youth Justice Board, 2013):
• the under-18 youth offender institution sector price, which was expected
to be £171 between April and June 2013 and £160 from July 2013 to
March 2014 due to the planned decommissioning of Ashfield YOI, subject
to finalization with the private sector provider;
• the total number of bed nights, following data verification this was
145,702 for England and Wales; and
• impact of the new remand framework and population adjustment for
2012/2013, as population data showed a “significant and sustained reduc-
tion in the number of children on remand in under-18 YOIs” (Ministry of
Justice and Youth Justice Board, 2013). The YOI remand population was
adjusted by -26% to take account of the reduction. A reduction to take into
account the impact of new remand framework (which places a stricter test
on the use of remand into custody) was not applied.
In a presentation to the London Councils in March 2013, Sean Dunkling
(a senior manager in Wandsworth Council) acknowledged that the transfer
of budgets for YOI placement costs was an “incentive for local authorities
to reduce unnecessary secure remands and reinvest any savings achieved”
(Dunkling, 2013). However, he suggested that taking together the transfer of
the remand YOI budget and the introduction of looked-after-children status for
young people remanded into custody (a part of the transfer of responsibility)
meant that his council was facing a £321,000 funding shortfall after taking
into account the £281,697 indicative allocation for YOI remands for 2013/2014
(Dunkling, 2013).
The transfer of the remand custody budget for youths to local authorities
is significant; it represents the first mainstream devolution of criminal justice
funds to local authorities. However, the extent to which the level of devolved
funds make the scheme viable, rather than a financial burden for local author-
ities, is difficult to determine at this stage; the transfer only took place in April
2013. Also it is too early to tell the extent to which the budget transfer has
affected youth justice practice—according to Dunkling, reducing “unnecessary
secure remands”—now that remand into custody is not a free service for local
authorities.
MODELS OF JUSTICE REINVESTMENT: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR SYSTEM
REDESIGN?
As indicated earlier, the JR movement which started in the United States has
influenced the development of JR in the United Kingdom.
Social Justice Redesign Underpinned by Justice Reinvestment
Theory
Early concepts of JR were motivated by the observation that some com-
munities are clearly more in need of criminal justice interventions than are
others. This is the observation lying behind Cadora’s (2007, p. 11) so-called
“million-dollar blocks.”
The question that Cadora and other pioneers of JR posed was simply
whether the financial resources spent on incarceration might be better spent
on other criminal justice/social justice interventions. The suggestion and
vision of JR was to “to invest in public safety by reallocating justice dollars
to refinance education, housing, healthcare, and jobs” (Cadora, 2007, p. 11).
This early model of JR places criminal justice within a broader model of
social justice; the strategy implies it is less than efficient to separate the two.
Thus, part of the JR approach is to prevent criminality arising in the first
place and, where it does arise, to address its underlying causes in communities
and families. Social innovations based on rehabilitation cannot reach those
individuals who are currently at risk of becoming first-time offenders; it is so-
called “pre-habilitation” which will reach these people. Clearly, interventions
based on “pre-habilitation” (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2009) must
take a holistic view of the society from which offenders come.
In their consideration of the strengths of the JR approach, the Commission
on English Prisons Today (2009) argues “Justice Reinvestment is not about
alternatives within the criminal justice process, it is about alternatives outside
of it” (p. 49). To the commission, the JR approach allows the social considera-
tion of the problem of criminality. It is in the interlinking of localized costs and
benefits—including social costs and benefits—where real opportunities arise
for innovation and cost savings.
Criminal Justice System Redesign Underpinned by Justice
Reinvestment Theory
La Vigne, Neusteter, Lachman, Dwyer, and Nadeau (2010), in their guide
to planning and implementing JR programs in the United States, advocated
diverting individuals from the criminal justice system to more effective and
cheaper options. Such diversion may take place at key points in the system:
arrest, pretrial, case processing, sentencing, discharge from prison, and com-
munity supervision. However, they put rehabilitation center stage—as well as
strategies to reduce the number of people entering the criminal justice system
and to expedite the criminal justice process. However, La Vigne et al. also place
considerable emphasis on reducing reoffending through the greater use of pris-
oner reentry programs before and after release. They also advocate the use of
the rate of recidivism as a measure of program success in a local jurisdiction
(La Vigne et al., 2010, p. 71); again emphasizing that the reduction of reof-
fending arising from more effective rehabilitation is an important component
of JR.
In the United Kingdom, Lanning, Loader, and Muir (2011) likewise set
out a vision for JR in which offenders are diverted from the criminal justice
system and, within the criminal justice system, more offenders are diverted
away from custody to community alternatives. There is, at the heart of their
model, a redesigned offender management system which will be more effective
than custody in cutting reoffending rates:
The goal, if it can be reached, is a great one: a criminal justice system that both
punishes offenders and rehabilitates them, that costs less and is more effective at
tackling crime and protecting the public. (Lanning et al., 2011, p. 3)
Community sentences are recommended precisely because Lanning et al. feel
they are more likely to be effective in rehabilitation than a custodial sentence—
particularly a short-term custodial sentence (Lanning et al., 2011, p. 10).
The delivery model adopted by West Yorkshire, one of the pilot sites for the
Youth Justice Reinvestment Pathfinder Initiative mentioned above reflects a
system redesign approach to reducing custody bed nights for young offenders
(aged up to 18). By analyzing custody bed night data local agencies iden-
tified the key entry points into custody and in response to this identified
practice changes and interventions to reduce remands into custody and cus-
todial sentences by offering robust community alternatives. They also aimed
to reduce the duration of custodial sentences, by supporting appeals against
sentence length mounted by defense barristers, and the incidence of breach
offenses through better engagement and contact with young offenders and
their families (O’Hara, 2013).
Similarly, the Transition to Adulthood (T2A) Alliance, a coalition of
12 criminal justice, health, and youth organizations convened by the Barrow
Cadbury Trust have identified “ten points in the criminal justice process where
a more rigorous and effective approach for young adults and young people in
the transition to adulthood (16–24) can be delivered” (Transition to Adulthood
Alliance, 2011), referring to these as the T2A pathways from crime. However,
of the ten points identified by the alliance, arguably only six are pathway
intervention points in the criminal system: policing and arrest, prosecution,
sentencing, community sentence, custody, and resettlement. The remaining
“points” are pathway processes which could occur at any of six intervention
points—diversion to drug, alcohol, and mental health provision; restorative
justice; managing the transfer process between youth and adult criminal
justice systems; and enabling desistance from crime.
What these examples illustrate is that recently the focus of JR in the
United Kingdom has remained “efficiency” in dealing with offenders, rather
than seeking to divert the vulnerable from crime altogether. The concept of
efficiency and the time frame over which savings may accrue have been recon-
sidered, as is indicated by the assessments of limited cashable savings for
the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot detailed above, compared to the more
generous estimates in the case of the Youth Justice Reinvestment Pathfinder
Initiative. Increasingly the aspirations of JR programs have focused on reduc-
ing the use of incarceration through analysis of demand for prison places and
identifying opportunities at different points in the system to divert offend-
ers from custody and/or reduce the likelihood of reoffending on release. This
model of JR—which we may describe as a criminal justice system redesign
approach—focuses attention on what is happening within the criminal justice
system. System redesign is a pragmatic response to austerity conditions, given
that this is within the preserve of criminal justice agencies. However, in not
extending their reach beyond the criminal justice system these programs may
miss the opportunity to prevent criminality in the first place.
Justice Reinvestment as a Continuum
We would not argue that JR interventions will generally fall neatly into one
of two categories: social justice and criminal justice redesign. In reality social 
justice and criminal justice are not mutually exclusive models; they represent 
two ends of the scale of JR as a continuum. In practice the approach that is 
adopted by local, regional, or national agencies may be shaped by dynamic 
factors—factors, such as the following, which can (and do) change over time:
• Political acceptability. In these financially tight times, it may be easier to
describe JR as offering a cost effective criminal justice system than as a
way to champion social justice.
• Ability to redirect budgets for public services. In the United Kingdom, bud-
gets which might be brought together to offer a more holistic social justice
approach to JR are retained within individual government departments.
This constrains their reallocation at a regional and local level.
• Short-term versus long-term planning. Redesigning the criminal justice
system offers a quicker fix than a redesign of social welfare interventions.
Real life experience suggests JR is a journey—an observation made by
Jennet Peters in conversation with the authors in 2011. At the time she was the
reducing reoffending lead at Government Office North West, and the strategic
advisor to the Greater Manchester Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot. In 2011,
her view of the Greater Manchester pilot was that they were on a journey
taking a step toward JR as a broader social justice–focused public service man-
agement approach. At the time the pilot was narrowly focused on efficiency
measures to divert individuals from more expensive interventions within the
criminal justice system at four key points: arrest, sentencing, release from
prison, and the transition between youth and adult criminal justice systems
(Wong et al., 2013). This mirrored the system-based reduction approach to JR
advocated by La Vigne et al. (2010). Arguably this was a rational response to
the funding that was available as “the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot pro-
vided no upfront funding to enable initial investment in interventions and pro-
cesses” (Wong et al., 2013). The payment structure was cited by the local agen-
cies across the six sites as one of the reasons why they made limited changes
other than those that were generally already in train (Wong et al., 2013).
However, during the first year of the pilot, Greater Manchester became
involved in the Whole Place Community Budget pilot which aimed to break
down the spending and funding constraints between government budgets and
allow local agencies the flexibility to allocate funds for more upstream pre-
habilitation work as well as integrate criminal justice services more closely
with noncriminal justice services—such as accommodation and employment—
through the development of new service delivery models (Wong et al., 2013).
This latter development has enabled the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot
in Greater Manchester to move from the systems-based approach along the
continuum toward the broader social justice end of JR.
FUTURE CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JUSTICE
REINVESTMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The Economy
In the United Kingdom in 2007, the government spent approximately
2.5% of GDP on public order and safety, the highest of all countries in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Duffy,
Wake, Burrows, & Bremner, 2007). Up until the 2008 economic crisis spending
had been remorselessly increasing. The total budget for the Ministry of Justice
for 2009/2010 was just over £10 billion (Ministry of Justice, 2009) and the
National Offender Management Service (NOMS) budget, from which the cost
of prisons is met, was approximately £4 billion of this. In 2010 the UK coalition
government announced an ambitious cost reduction of 23% over four years for
the two government departments with joint and sometimes competing respon-
sibility for criminal justice: the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office. Their
targets for capital spending were reduced by 50% and 49%, respectively (Her
Majesty’s Treasury, 2010).
On June 26, 2013, George Osbourne, the Coalition Government Chancellor
of the Exchequer, announced further spending cuts to be undertaken by
2015/2016 (compared to the 2014/2015 baseline): a further 10% reduction
of funding for the Ministry of Justice and a slightly smaller reduction of
6.1% for the Home Office (Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2013). The budgets for the
Department for Communities and Local Government and the Department for
Work and Pensions, government departments whose remit includes social jus-
tice outcomes such as accommodation and employment and benefits, have also
been cut by 10% and 9.5%, respectively, over the same time period. If the holis-
tic model of JR is correct, such cuts will impact on criminal justice outcomes.
Nor is austerity likely to end any time soon, if ever. In Ed Milliband’s speech
to the Labour Party National Policy Forum on June 22, 2013 (in advance of
Osbourne’s budget announcements), the Labour Party leader stated “we can-
not reverse any cut in day to day, current spending unless it is fully funded
from cuts elsewhere or extra revenue.” In effect this is a promise that a future
Labour government will match the Coalition government’s spending plans
(Milliband, 2013).
The climate of further cuts to services arising from these budget reduc-
tions is likely to promote less innovative behavior in relation to criminal
justice innovation. Budget cuts and financial uncertainty arising from the
2010 spending round was identified by local agencies involved in the Local
Justice Reinvestment Pilot as another of the factors influencing their decision
to make limited service changes (Wong et al., 2013).
Organizational Complexity
The sheer number of organizations currently involved in the delivery of
custodial and community sentences in England and Wales also appears likely
to promote less innovative approaches to criminal justice interventions. This
is because there is a high degree of organizational complexity, which makes
it difficult for cross-agency coordination in delivering effective services which
support pre-habilitation, rehabilitation, and prevention. Overall responsibil-
ity for criminal justice lies with the Ministry of Justice, a central government
department; however, this is shared with the Home Office (which has respon-
sibility for policing), the recently created Police and Crime Commissioners,
and local community safety partnerships—and takes the lead for integrated
offender management across the two departments.
The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) is an executive
agency of the Ministry of Justice responsible for commissioning and deliver-
ing prison and probation services in England and Wales. NOMS is responsible
for the National Probation Service and Her Majesty’s Prison Service. Through
these it delivers offender services by means of (National Offender Management
Service, 2012) 35 probation trusts, 119 public sector prisons, and several
private sector organizations which between them operate 12 prisons under
contract and provide other services including prisoner escorts and electronic
monitoring of offenders in the community. As we discuss below, further orga-
nizational change is planned. Change is inevitable, as conventional wisdom
would have it: improvement, on the other hand, is not guaranteed.
The Policy Landscape
As mentioned above, the coalition government of the Conservative Party
and Liberal Democrats signaled their intention to introduce a “rehabilita-
tion revolution” in the coalition agreement (Her Majesty’s Government, 2010).
Central to the rehabilitation revolution is the use of PbR (Fox & Albertson,
2011). In its Breaking the Cycle green paper, the Ministry of Justice pro-
posed extending the principle of PbR to all services for offenders by 2015
(Ministry of Justice, 2010b). PbR, as implemented by the UK government, is
narrowly focused on privatization and marketization of criminal justice—that
is, it focuses on system redesign. Thus, it might form a part of a JR innovation;
however, it should not be confused with JR.
Further reforms have recently been proposed in Transforming Rehabi-
litation: A Revolution in the Way We Manage Offenders (Ministry of
Justice, 2013b). These latest proposals reiterate the intention to introduce a
widespread program of competition so that the majority of community-based
offender services are subject to competition with providers drawn from the pri-
vate and voluntary sectors and the existing probation service is potentially
allowed to join the competition by setting up new independent entities (such
as employee-led mutuals). It is beyond the scope of this paper to comment on
the merits or drawbacks of the proposed reforms. We restrict ourselves to iden-
tifying some potential opportunities to implement a radical model of JR within
this emerging policy landscape.
A mixed economy of criminal justice provision is envisaged by Tucker and
Cadora (2003) in their original sketch of the JR model of social innovation.
They suggest that the cycle of offending and reoffending can be broken by a
concerted effort from national government; state government; NGOs; the pri-
vate sector; and the individual and their community at risk from criminality
working together to improve education, health, job training, and (especially
pertinent given the recent rise in youth unemployment worldwide, particularly
in Western democracies) job creation. The latest UK government reforms favor
a mixed economy of criminal justice provision; this is conducive to a model of
JR designed to deliver social justice (Fox et al., 2013a).
The model of JR we discussed above (further elaborated in Fox et al.,
2013) and the original model of JR developed by Tucker and Cadora (2003)
envisage a holistic approach to pre-habilitation and rehabilitation that extends
beyond the efforts of criminal justice agencies. In Transforming Rehabilitation
the government is explicit in its desire to see providers of rehabilitation
services “tackling offenders’ broader life management issues” (Ministry of
Justice, 2013b, p. 17). It also recognizes the need for offenders to be able to
access a range of public services provided by other government departments
and agencies in order to tackle the multiple issues that offenders often have.
Thus interest in maximizing results from collective government and public
sector resources is explicitly linked to delivering more effective social justice
(Ministry of Justice, 2013b).
The recently elected (in November 2012) local Police and Crime
Commissioners (PCCs) in England and Wales could provide a single point of
political leadership needed to drive forward JR at a local level. However, a
cursory review of some of the police and crime plans produced by PCCs sug-
gests a limited ambition and a lack of understanding or even awareness of
JR. The latest UK rehabilitation proposals set out a model for commission-
ing services with the geographies across which services will be commissioned
having co-terminosity with PCC administrative boundaries in 7 of the 21 con-
tract package areas (Ministry of Justice, 2013c). In the other 14 areas these
cover 2 or 3 PCC administrative boundaries (Ministry of Justice, 2013c), which
are likely to make such arrangements more complicated. In their evaluation
of the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot, Wong et al. (2013) recommended that
future PbR and JR initiatives should be commissioned at a geographical level
with “groupings of local authorities which are coterminous with the key crimi-
nal justice agencies: police forces, probation trusts, court structures and police
and crime commissioners” (Wong et al., 2013, p. 34). This was based on the
experience of Greater Manchester, where such co-terminosity operated and
facilitated the delivery of the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot, notwithstand-
ing some coordination challenges arising from geographical size and the need
to work across ten local authorities (Wong et al., 2013).
Capacity and Capability
As mentioned earlier, JR is a data driven process and, as such, requires
agencies to have both the capacity and capability to analyze data and to use
it to inform strategy and delivery through effective performance management.
The evidence from the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot suggests that such
capacity and capability was in short supply.
The absence of effective performance management to support the LJR pilots
across some sites was perceived to be partly due to having limited access to the
desired range of management information held by MoJ [Ministry of Justice] on a
frequent and timely basis; the commitment of local agencies to undertake perfor-
mance management; the capacity and capability of local staff to analyse central
and local data and to use this to inform delivery; and the capacity and capability
of staff to undertake an investment appraisal analysis of available options. (Wong
et al., 2013, p. 32)
There is anecdotal evidence that absence of such analytical capacity may
in part be explained by the abolition of regional Government Office and
reductions in local authority and policing budgets as noted by Fox et al.
(2013b).
As indicated above, the proposed outsourcing of community based offender
management services to private and voluntary sector agencies is not with-
out its challenges. While David Cameron has championed the role of the “big
society” (Cameron, 2010)—the involvement of the voluntary and community
sector (VCS) in the management and delivery of public services—as noted by
Wong (2013) there needs to be a more nuanced and realistic assessment of
the capacity of the VCS to deliver offender management services. The range
in the capabilities of the VCS varies widely and reflects the diversity of a sec-
tor which encompasses large organizations with annual turnovers in excess
of £5 million with many paid staff, down to small organizations with an
annual turnover of less than £10,000, principally run by volunteers (Wong,
2013).
This is highlighted by the experience of the VCS involvement in integrated
offender management in four pilot sites in England. Wong, O’Keeffe, Meadows,
Davidson, and Bird (2012) uncovered some challenges:
• The need for local VCS infrastructure organizations to act in a broker-
age role, between the VCS (which had previous limited involvement in the
criminal justice system) and statutory criminal justice agencies.
• Increasing the involvement of the VCS in delivering services to offenders,
including the use of volunteers, required resources, and funding incentives
to build such capacity.
The default position of previous governments to fund VCS capacity building
initiatives as a means of addressing this may not necessarily be the answer
given the relative lack of efficacy of such programs, as noted byWong (in press).
CONCLUSION
Resisting the Seduction of Radical Change
Tim Harford, a senior columnist with the Financial Times and presenter
of the BBC’s program on statistics “More or Less,” has argued that organi-
zations need to strike a balance between innovations derived from making
marginal improvements and opting for more radical risky change. In a talk
given at Wired 2012, he described the small improvements that Matt Parker
made to help the British cycling team win seven out of ten gold medals at the
London Olympics in 2012 (Solon, 2012). Matt Parker’s job title was “Head of
Marginal Gains.” The marginal improvements he instigated included advising
the cyclists to bring their favorite pillow with them to the games to maximize
their sleeping, using specially designed hot pants to keep their muscles warm,
and rubbing alcohol along the wheels of the bikes to remove dust and grime
and optimize aerodynamic performance (Solon, 2012).
However, no amount of marginal gains could have turned the cheap bicycle
to a modern racing machine; sometimes radical reform is needed. The example
that Harford gave for radical change was the competition held by the UK Air
Ministry in the 1930s to find a single-seat fighter plane, an unusual request
at the time given that fighter planes were two-seat models for a pilot and a
gunner (Solon, 2012). The design that Air Commodore Henry Cave-Browne-
Cave decided to commission became the Spitfire—much admired by Herman
Goering—that helped Britain to win the Battle of Britain (Solon, 2012).
In the context of the two models of JR mentioned above, the criminal jus-
tice system redesign approach falls into Harford’s notion of innovation through
marginal gains and the social justice model of JR with that of radical change.
While the concept of an inclusive social justice model of JR may be seductive to
criminal justice reformers in the United Kingdom looking for an alternative to
the coalition government’s drive for PbR commissioning (The Howard League
for Penal Reform, 2013), the example of the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot
suggests there are significant limitations to the feasibility of implementing
this more widely (Wong et al., 2013). Given the likely continuation of David
Cameron’s age of austerity along with the current policy landscape and the
capability and capacity of agencies to implement JR approaches, the example
that the Greater Manchester Local Justice Reinvestment pilot offers is a more
pragmatic solution. It may be easier in the first instance to commence the JR
journey with a criminal justice system redesign approach en route toward a
more social justice destination. As the Chinese philosopher Laozi wrote in the
Tao Te Ching, “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.”
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